Iran Threatens Europe with Drugs and Migrants

Iran Threatens Europe with Drugs and Migrants

Iran Threatens Europe with Drugs and Migrants

When will Europe learn that helping Iran skirt sanctions will not reward them with economic gains nor the security they seek. President Rouhani is threatening Europe with floods of migrants to their borders and drugs. It’s called narcoterrorism and Iran is a major chemical producer of heroin from poppies grown in Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the region.

The trafficking in narcotics from Iran runs to Eastern Europe through Turkey and also includes human slave trade and arms smuggling. Though this drug war began in Afghanistan by the US efforts in the Cold War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to compromise the Soviet Union. Today it is considered effective narco-terrorism by Iran and its allies to shift the drug flows west to destabilize western society. The US military and intelligence refers to this as blowback.

It is not a coincidence that rivers of heroin and other narcotics are invading western countries at the same time corrupt officials want to legalize drug use under the banner that sales can be regulated. This would simply be another service to sponsors of narco-terrorism and effectively turn these and other drug cartels into wholesalers to attack western states from within.

While conflicts and economic ruin are sending millions of migrants towards safer places in Europe and the US, loose border policies have been exploited and have enabled this blowback to reach maturity. The mainstream media is blaming this move by Iran to be the result of US sanctions on Iran, but this covert war has long preceded sanctions.

Europe is incurring tremendous expense in the efforts to stop migration from Africa and the Middle East including people escaping Iran, and these examples are chief reasons for the tougher border policies in the US and greater expenses by Congress to more quickly process legitimate asylum seekers amidst migration attacks.

Solutions Between Security, AID, and Development Problems

Solutions Between Security, AID, and Development Problems

[continued from International Security Crisis and Development in Africa: The Allure of Globalism to Fund the Pursuit of Peace and Africa’s Wealth of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas, and Prior Development Attempts, and Weapons Flows, Regional Conflicts, Gun Culture, and Failures of Disarmament]

The US recently increased defense spending by $87 billion to $716 billion for 2019. US Africa Command is currently witnessing its 10 year anniversary and supports about 1,000 personnel operating in the Sahel region alone supporting African-led and French assisted missions. This is a significant percentage of the total of number of uniformed personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors that work on any given day at 7,200 men and women.  US AFRICOM’s drone base is relocating from Niamey to the city of Agadez in Niger and is providing training and equipment to Nigerian Armed Forces under the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership. While enemy combatants in Niger are largely forces belonging to Al-Qaeda and ISIS-Greater Sahara, Chad is composed of mainly Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. The US AFRICOM mission in Chad includes logistics, sustainment, and maintenance with the Chadian Special Anti-Terrorism Group (SATG). In addition, the US military is also helping with intelligence, border surveillance and counter-IED capabilities according to a recent testimony before Congress.

While conflict areas in Africa remain high priorities for global security, local civilian populations in these areas will continue to demand AID. However, the current state of AID remains the subject of wide criticism for corruption. In an effort to address internal corruption within many AID programs, Congress is in the process of possibly rolling up some organizations. In addition to this, the US government and international community addressing the security and humanitarian crisis should institute a multilevel program that begins in AID provided at the crisis phase and ends in development finance upon reaching increasing levels of stability. Results should be measured at milestones and benchmarks along the way in order for local governments to be provided the opportunity to qualify and meet expectations for future development that require outside countries and the businesses to take risks. These milestones showing incremental progress along targeted benchmarks in stability and growth will drive the risk of development down and increase interest for private investment. Currently AID programs do not require local governments to set goals that can reached to show investors and risk assessors progress which could drastically affect credit and financing and offer collateral.

Further, no coordination exists between local governments, public private partnerships, private companies, and NGOs working in the same geographic areas with each investing resources in its own agenda irrespective of opportunities to pool resources, divide costs, and promote shared or common interests. This lack of coordination increases the overhead of each organization and can even create imbalances or introduce new problems between multiple institutional efforts. This coordination should be taking place across the continent as well, because opposing visions for the security and development of Africa are currently contributing to the instability of the region which has reached a global scale.

This can be seen currently in mass migration movements. While terrorism is shaping the Horn of Africa and the Sahel and West Africa, the other more stable Sub Saharan countries are undergoing large scale development but in such a way as to contribute to the security and humanitarian problems on the continent. Large scale land purchases in Tanzania, Guinea, Gobon, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, D.R. Congo, and Mozambique by foreign entities in Korea, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Europe, and others for industrial farming has contributed towards continental deforestation, desertification, other ecological problems, as well as mass migration. Land purchases in order to carve large industrial farms have been recorded as lows as US$0.80/hectare/year in Ethiopia and $0.50 – $7.10 per hectare/year in other countries. These land conversions to industrial farms is also sending the majority of the continent’s food supply for export while requiring increasing quantities of food from AID programs to import food or cash injections to buy it.

The distribution of food needs to be reorganized with public and private sector cooperation regionally and internationally, because relatively few infrastructure projects are being built in compensation for these low values of land, and the creation of industrial farms has driven many of the local populations including local farmers into migration. The quantity of land purchased for industrial farms measures almost the size of the United States. Migrants pushed out of these lands show a high probability of inflating numbers to conflict areas where rebels recruit a steady stream of fresh fighters among migrants. With unemployment being one of the big drivers of migration, the lack of education and job training are secondary problems of employment to the issue of employable men being former combatants from violent extremists networks. NGOs working in disarmament and reeducation of former al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Boko Haram, or al-Shabaab servants discuss the difficulties of having such a large percentage of the workforce in a country or region being former combatants whom nobody wants.

African migrants who are also former combatants will continue to be a problem for African countries and foreign interests much the same way that Idlib is in Syria, but on a much larger scale. Idlib currently houses some 30,000 terrorists of differing nationalities ranging from European to Middle Eastern and Asian in which their country of origin will not accept their reentry.  Often disarmed former combatants are driven from their families and neighborhoods and employers do not want to hire former terrorists. Thus the placement of former al-Qaeda, IS, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab or other violent extremist group will continue to limit the size of the region’s desirable work force and hinder the progress of security, law enforcement, and border protection. Thus, the manner in which large land purchases are made and development projects commence should target local populations for work and attract peaceful migrants to new jobs instead of continuing to displace workers that could potentially fuel rebel militias.

Development and foreign investment also needs to fuel the local economy and the local government’s ability to finance further infrastructure and industry development. Stable countries that are undergoing economic transformation should serve as a model for countries currently engaged in conflict. African countries should leverage the competition between foreign interests to maximize their development capacity and negotiate reciprocal engagements within public private partnerships and close loopholes that fuel corruption on multiple sides. With critical infrastructure needed in the US, Europe especially UK, Russia, and China as well as throughout Africa, the resource development of mining minerals, oil, and gas in African countries should be organized with the cross-development of infrastructure in both Africa and outside countries.

This would create a new development model for the continent that could reduce risk to foreign investment and head off further instability caused by imbalanced state agreements, loans, or one-sided business deals. In other words, the development of oil, gas, and mining industries in African countries should fuel infrastructure development in both the African country and foreign country investing in security and AID. This way, the African country receives security, AID, infrastructure, and industry development, and the foreign country receives raw materials needed for infrastructure development in its country. Private companies get the domestic and international business to build the infrastructure and develop industries. The cross-development of infrastructure between Africa the outside country would lower the risk factor for investment. This approach serves the peace and stability of the region and the global community.

Weapons Flows, Regional Conflicts, Gun Culture, and Failures of Disarmament

Weapons Flows, Regional Conflicts, Gun Culture, and Failures of Disarmament

Weapons Flows, Regional Conflicts, Gun Culture, and Failures of Disarmament

[continued from International Security Crisis and Development in Africa: The Allure of Globalism to Fund the Pursuit of Peace and Africa’s Wealth of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas, and Prior Development Attempts]

Regional conflicts including revolutions, civil wars in Libya, Chad, and Sudan have choreographed weapons flows in the Sahel and bred a subsequent gun culture among society surrounding personal defense and the protection of property. Attempts to absorb rebel or terrorist combatants into national armies and disarm combatants have produced mixed results leaving much of the region with a continuous high demand for personal weapons.

The first armed resistance movement to form in independent Chad followed the replacement of French soldiers with Chadians in 1965 who proved to be more abusive than the French. The customary authority in Chad known as the derde, Weddey Kihidemi, relocated to Libya in 1966 and recruited exiled dissidents founding the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (Frolinat) in Nyala, South Darfur and this movement was the birth of all subsequent rebel movements since. Eventually the Frolinat splintered into other groups until in 1997 the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT) evolved into the MDJT War that lasted from 1997 to 2011. The opposition movement was founded by about a dozen civilians and army officers from Tibesti in N’Djaména and consisted of 13 fighters equipped with five firearms. However, it was able to quickly recruit and gain assistance including financing, weapons, and recruits among the Teda living in Libya, Chad, and Nigeria where they had previously been excluded or marginalized. Over time, the Qaddafi regime in Libya grew from passive goodwill to logistical support and intelligence services to eventually after 2001 repression of the MDJT and other Libyan Teda.

Overcoming the MDJT for the Chadian government proved to be a gradual process of surrenders taking place from 2003-2011 with some ANT veterans arguing that their infiltration into the rebel movement proved to be more effective than pressure in the field. The weapons were collected during these years was soon made up for with the fall of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 that lead to a resupply of looted weapons from Libya’s arsenals to rebel movements between Libya, Chad, and Sudan that lasted until 2013.

Yet not all of the weapons supplies have come from Libya and Chad. Sudan’s Civil War from 1983 to 2005 and beyond has also contributed to the demand, availability, and use of weapons in the region. According to Case Study Number 7 of Operations Case Studies Series Disarmament in South Sudan by Cecily Brewer, Sudan was the first test case by the United Nations of an “integrated” civil-military approach to disarmament. Disarmament campaigns take up three phases usually following peace agreements including: disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR). Combatants are given the opportunity to give up their weapons and be placed in either centralized armies or jobs in local trade. In Sudan, this was introduced between 2005 and 2006, but the campaign faced organizational problems with the United Nations and local government, and struggled to bring about the funding into 2007 which by that time was too late.

The campaign was further compromised by internal disagreements. The cofounder of the Small Arms Survey, Robert Muggah, describes the institutional problems as “‘weaknesses in political leadership within and outside the United Nations, the absence of clear direction from headquarters, competing understandings of DDR among managers and practitioners, and confusion over financing mechanisms.’’ Additional disputes arose between the UN and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army which supported forced disarmament while the United Nations resolution authorized only the voluntary disarmament and destruction of weapons. According to the Sudanese experience, the killing of 500 provided an incentive for other combatants to surrender their weapons.

Other logistical nightmares such as problems with the terrain and travel in South Sudan made the expectations of the UN headquarters and home offices which demanded immediate or quick action unrealistic. In addition, the uneven execution of DDR contributed in some cases to rearmament of combatants. This has occurred in South Sudan with opposing forces were not disarmed at the same time; when those who have disarmed were not effectively defended; and when those who must be disarmed are also the only suppliers of food such as livestock or other essential goods. When the SPLA where sent to disarm northern Jonglei communities that supplied them with cattle, the Jonglei were able to starve members of SPLA forces who subsisted on the cattle. According the case study, when one UN official was asked about equal and simultaneous disarmament in South Sudan, the response was, “‘Forget it; it’s not possible.’” Another regional problem of arms flows is the paid surrender of combatants. With European powers willing to pay militias to surrender in an effort to stabilize the region or limit the flow of migrants to southern Europe, more funds have been introduced to armed factions that can easily reinvest money earned for surrenders that turn out to be temporarily honored.

This region of Africa is also susceptible to the arms flows to and from other parts of the continent including the Horn of Africa where al-Shabaab and other armed Islamic groups coordinate with those active in North and West Africa including Boko Haram, AQIM, and IS. Middle East countries including Qatar have aided Sunni Islamic groups and Iran uses the influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to expand both licit and illicit trade interests in African countries. Russia has directly engaged in arms sales and the sharing of nuclear technology in Africa in exchange for access to resources including mining material, oil, and gas. Most of the rifles documented among militia groups are Kalashnikovs or Kalashnikov knock-offs. These collective threats have brought the US and other western powers to engage in security operations. 

While trafficking in weapons occurs with the slave trade and other criminal exploits including narcotics and counterfeit products, the support of the arms trade does not depend on currency but can be traded for any of these goods in demand. This also means that the arms trade itself may in turn support trafficking of humans, narcotics, and other contraband. This issue combined with the operations of clandestine nuclear activities raises the bar on the level of possible threat emanating from the region. Chad and Nigeria are both uranium producing countries, and Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Algeria border countries are all engaged at some level of acquiring nuclear programs with the help of Russia. In the case of Sudan, both Russia and China are contributing towards a nuclear program in Sudan in exchange for development. This increases the regional supply and global sales of nuclear related material between Africa and the Middle East requiring further international monitoring and additional arms support to protect the material in transit between both African states from clandestine forces and illicit trafficking.

International Security Crisis and Development in Africa: The Allure of Globalism to Fund the Pursuit of Peace

International Security Crisis and Development in Africa: The Allure of Globalism to Fund the Pursuit of Peace

Globalism to Combat Instability

Liberal think tanks are using the allure of globalist expansion to recruit companies to invest in Africa while the stability of the region remains a military effort. While some areas are secure for trade, for others it may prove premature. One such organization called, the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) recently published the study A Vision of Africa’s Future Mapping Change, Transformations, and Trajectories Towards 2030. In the study ISPI says that democracy is the new normal in Africa since the 1990s. Nothing could be further from the reality on the ground. Companies should be wary of paying for research that is politically motivated. While some parts of Africa are stable for development, others require substantial support in the war on terror and the fight against global trafficking. In the last several years, an alarming number of liberal think tanks have emerged internationally with underlying agendas that are truly frightening. The Third Way is another such radical left organization that has been gaining momentum in the liberal media. 

The development agenda primarily follows ongoing campaigns to secure the region where weak governance, porous borders, extremism, and migration have contributed to the destabilization of Europe’s security and socialized economy and amplified threats to the United States. President Trump’s border agenda and counterterrorism policy along with the Build Act for Africa and the $60 billion allocated towards development there reflect a greater emphasis on security than development and for good reason. The Sahel particularly the area known as the Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa constitute significant security demands. The World Bank has announced the opening of offices and a loan budget for development in Libya in association with the International Monetary Fund to attract Foreign Direct Investment but neither organization has not disclosed their amounts for development, while the Chad-Sudan-Libya triangle remains an international security crisis and a rough target for investment which will continue until the area is secured militarily and politically.

Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad-Sudan-Libya Triangle released by Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, the Security Assessment in North Africa with Conflict Armament Research and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals what is actually the new normal for this landscape, and it is far from a peaceful democratic process. Around 50,000 (mainly Sudanese and Eritrean) migrants are estimated to travel from Sudan to Libya either directly or indirectly through Chad to claim political asylum in Europe due to repression in their own countries. While the mainstream media has pushed the plight of refugees and immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, Europe has been working behind the scenes to do everything possible to halt the flow of immigrants and asylum seekers into the countries of the European Union.

In 2016 the EU donated EUR 40 million to authorities in Sudan to limit migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe as part of the ‘Khartoum Process’. The New Arab reported Britain spent 180 million pounds to stop the flow of migrants from Africa to Europe. Europe has also provided financial and political incentives to countries in the Sahel also designed to curb the flow of refugees seeking asylum in Europe including migrants from Libya, Chad, and Sudan. The business of trafficking migrants can earn USD 250 million per year for traffickers in this part of the world. Smuggling routes used by traffickers also transport illicit weapons, narcotics, and commodities like cigarettes and satellite phones. With non-state militias some of which are terrorist networks in control of many checkpoints along these routes, the business of illegal trafficking or armed mercenary service are among the few ways to earn a living in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. In one case recorded in a recent arms study traffickers of migrants earned between USD 5,000–15,000 per truck to transport people from Agadez in Niger and Fezzan. The pursuit of traffickers has reduced the size of trucks in some areas to smaller 4 x 4 vehicles that achieve faster speeds with clandestine routes changing constantly. Those who control checkpoints institute illegal taxes to travel and charge migrant caravans by the vehicle and by the head. One truck driver reported that on seven occasions between Sebha and Zouar bandits had stopped demanding illegal taxes or tolls under the threat of death, ‘you give or they kill you.’ Hostage takings for ransom payments are also common to this landscape.

The journey for some migrants between checkpoints is disrupted by forced labor to work on farms or in illegal mines. If ransom payments cannot be met, vehicle confiscation is a common woe. Militias also force migrants to join rebel forces engaged in regional conflicts. The military defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria has inflated terror networks in Africa and with the backing of some Middle East countries such as Qatar. ISIS is still considered a formidable force online with terror financing and recruiting. The Sahel and Horn of Africa is largely dominated by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, Islamic State, al Shabaab, and many other smaller less publicized radical Islamic factions.

Other nationalist and native rebel groups are engaged in efforts to resist the radicalization of their region like the Teda who are often compared with Kurish resistance in the Middle East. Teda populations exist in Libya, Chad, Sudan, and surrounding areas. On 18 November 2018, Africa News reported aerial bombardments deployed from N’Djamena to Miski where illegal gold mining is occurring as well as arms and human trafficking. The army is attempting to block all routes leading to these mines. This tactic is sometimes used with blockades to starve traffickers and illegal miners out of areas with gold deposits located in Chad, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Algeria. The desert area of Miski in Tibesti in Northern Chad is central to all locations of these gold deposits.

Next: Africa’s Wealth of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas, and Prior Development Attempts


Mike “Thomas Paine” Moore Exposes US Government Corruption with Secret Agreements with Iran and Saudi Arabia

Mike “Thomas Paine” Moore Exposes US Government Corruption with Secret Agreements with Iran and Saudi Arabia

Mike “Thomas Paine” Moore writes to expose Former CIA Director John Brennan among others in his book, Paine: How We Dismantled the FBI in Our Pajamas. The book available on Amazon provides an account of one cover up after another by George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Clinton Cartel, and a long line of FBI and CIA directors and other entities working together in one of the longest running scandals in recent history.

Working as one cohesive team subverting party lines and international borders this crew is responsible according to Mike Moore for the ruin the many who have pushed for investigations into Iran’s hiding of Osama bin Laden in the Islamic Republic after 9/11. The words the writer uses to describe these efforts are conspiracy and treason also involving former elites in the Saudi Kingdom and Supreme Leader Khamenei in Iran as the leader of the infamous Committee of Nine, a criminal ring of international and state-sponsored terrorism.

Of those whose careers and families have been brutally sabotaged in the cover ups are GOP Congressman Curt Weldon, former FBI Director Louis Freeh under Bill Clinton, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, former CIA Directors Porter Goss and Michael Hayden who is also a retired United States Air Force four-star general and former Director of the National Security Agency. Michael Hayden now a principal at the Chertoff Group and has authored two books on Intelligence called, The Assault on Intelligence: American National Security in an Age of Lies and Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror. Hayden recently criticized concessions on Iranian oil that were compromising the impact of sanctions.

Moore describes the detailed process of the FBI’s use of public raids and the media’s role to provide conveniently identical character assassinations in the press to destroy the reputations of those who tried to initiate the investigations on recovered intel for Osama bin Laden in Iran during both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, other documents published outside Mike Moore’s book detail the involvement of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 9/11 attack, and other documents released over the years discuss Iran’s hosting of al-Qaeda members in Iran under so called, “house arrest.” This would also partly explain some of the motivation to silence current protests in Iran against the Islamic Republic and the ongoing information handling within compromised media of Iran related topics as news.

This evidence certainly fits together to provide a more detailed picture of the Iran-Saudi secret alliance to serve al-Qaeda, and Moore’s account runs through the nuclear agreement that was used to keep Iran quiet and paid off by the Obama administration and other participants fighting the keep the agreement in place. The media are described as generals of the deep state running planted stories to annihilate its opposition such as the recent spin on the nuclear deal. The writer confirms Jamal Khashoggi as an al-Qaeda operative whose cover was a Washington Post journalist.

The book also provides insiders’ accounts of the Benghazi betrayal directly naming the FBI Director at the time, Robert Mueller who is now investigated President Trump, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, and Patrick Kennedy who worked under Hillary Clinton who were involved in grounding the rescue mission to save Ambassador Chris Stevens, Information Officer Sean Smith, and two CIA operatives, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods, both former Navy SEALs who died in 2012 that also led to the sabotage within just 2 months of the attack of CIA Director David Petraeus also a retired general who may have threatened to expose President Obama at the time.

For those keeping up with news on efforts to drain the DC swamp as well as events in Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, Mike Moore contributes valuable information to the effort of completing an accurate picture of recent history over the last several decades as a former FBI investigator himself with insider sources.

Ceasefire in Gaza Not Likely to Last

Ceasefire in Gaza Not Likely to Last

After some 500 rockets were sent into Israel by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, a cease-fire was reached with critics on both sides already gathering in protest. Protests this year have already claimed over 200 Palestinian protesters of the blockade on Gaza. 500 Hamas rockets and mortars tested weaknesses in Israel’s iron dome and called into action all IDF reserves after a Hamas leader was killed in a covert operation. Qatar and others have threatened to cut funding to Hamas over the conflict. Brazil is considering following the US pattern to shift embassies to Jerusalem. Egypt is criticizing both Israel and Brazil.

US State Department declared it stands with Israel but called for an immediate halt in aggression. IDF has confirmed that 20-plus Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza, including terror compounds, observation posts and rocket-launching squads have been hit. The ceasefire will return matters to 2014 conditions, but others are predicting further belligerence from Hamas and its supporters and ongoing covert or clandestine missions between Israel and Palestine connected to other conflicts in the region. The conflict in 2014 lasted about 50 days with anywhere between 50-150 rockets fired daily.

Critics are pointing out that since the last cease-fire agreement, Hamas has been given the opportunity to stockpile some 20,000 rockets and mortar shells and developed advanced combat weapons including multi-copper drones and small unmanned aerial vehicles without a care as to civilian casualties.

Source  | Source  | Source  | Source  | Source

Pin It on Pinterest